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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-2690
_____________
LUIS E. MUNOZ;
DEBORAH MUNOZ;
LUIS E. MUNOZ;
DEBORAH N. MUNOZ,
As Debtors In Bankruptcy,
Appellants
v.
SOVEREIGN BANK

On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(No. 06-cv-02876)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 5, 2008
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and COWEN Circuit Judges
(Filed April 23, 2009)

OPINION OF THE COURT

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
I.
Luis E. Munoz and Deborah N. Munoz (the Munozes) filed a complaint against

Sovereign Bank (Sovereign) in the District Court alleging that they were entitled to a
declaratory judgment that Sovereign violated the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act,
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8103, and that they were entitled to monetary damages based on
derivative claims for breach of contract, conversion and fraud. Sovereign moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the Munozes’s claims were barred by claim preclusion,
or res judicata. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Sovereign, and
the Munozes appealed. We will affirm.

II.
Because we write only for the parties, we will only address the facts and
procedural history of this case that are relevant to our analysis. In 2001, the Munozes
borrowed about $1 million from Sovereign in order to purchase a commercial property
and going business at 4401 Castor Avenue in Philadelphia. The loans were in part
secured by mortgages on both their home in Moorestown, New Jersey, as well as the
Castor Avenue property. In 2003, the Munozes defaulted on the note, and Sovereign
notified the Munozes of the default and accelerated the balance due. Sovereign instituted
a foreclosure action against the Castor Avenue property, and on April 7, 2004, obtained a
default judgment against the Munozes in the amount of $1,116,334.84.
On May 28, 2004, the Munozes’s counsel filed a bankruptcy petition on their
behalf and the Bankruptcy Court stayed judicial actions against them pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 362(a). Sovereign was eventually relieved from the automatic stay so that it

2

could pursue the foreclosure actions. In August, 2005, Sovereign purchased the Castor
Avenue property at a sheriff’s sale for about $31,000. Sovereign also reactivated its
foreclosure action against the Munozes’s Moorestown property, and received a default
judgment on August 19, 2005. Sovereign then ceased its actions against that property.
In December, 2005, the court-appointed bankruptcy trustee filed a Notice of
Proposed Private Sale with the Bankruptcy Court to sell the Munozes’s home to help to
satisfy the deficiency that remained against them after the sale of the Castor Avenue
property. The proposed sale price was $880,000. The Notice stated the following in
terms of the proceeds of the sale:
From the proceeds of the sale, Trustee proposes to pay normal closing costs and
adjustments, estimated to be no more than $4,000.00; real estate taxes to the
Township of Moorestown; first mortgage held by Chase Manhattan Bank of
approximately $156,000.00. The Trustee has negotiated a settlement with
Sovereign Bank, which holds a second mortgage on the property in an amount that
exceeds the purchase price, to allow a 10% carve-out to the bankruptcy estate, out
of which a 5% real estate commission will be paid to Edgar Real Estate. All
remaining proceeds are to be paid to Sovereign Bank.
Appendix 910a. The Munozes’s only objection was to the date that they needed to leave
the house, and this objection was resolved with the trustee. On January 26, 2006, the
Bankruptcy Court entered a Consent Order approving the sale of the Moorestown
property, and the property was sold on January 31, 2006. Sovereign received in excess of
$631,000 from the sale in order to help satisfy its default judgment against the Munozes.
On June 30, 2006, the Munozes sued Sovereign in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that Sovereign had failed to comply with
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the requirements of the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
8103(a). Sovereign moved to dismiss the case, arguing that certain documents showed
that the Munozes had waived their rights under the Deficiency Judgment Act, but the
District Court held that the Act prohibited such a waiver of rights, and denied the motion
to dismiss. See App. 9a. See also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat Ann. § 8103(e) (stating that any
agreement to waive rights under this Act is void).
Sovereign subsequently moved for summary judgment, and argued that the suit
should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, because the Munozes
should have litigated the suit in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. The
Munozes contended that the District Court’s prior decision, which had rejected
Sovereign’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, meant that there could be no
issue of claim preclusion, because they could not waive the protections of the
Pennsylvania statute. The District Court agreed with Sovereign and held that the waiver
issue was a separate issue from the res judicata issue, and that the Munozes were
precluded by res judicata from pursuing their claim under the Pennsylvania Deficiency
Judgment Act when they could have brought it before the Bankruptcy Court. The
Munozes now appeal the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Sovereign.
III.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment
4

de novo. Ideal Dairy Farms v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1996).
ASummary judgment should be granted only if a court concludes that >there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.=@ Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). When analyzing a summary judgment claim,
we must A>view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.=@ Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
IV.
The issue on appeal is whether the Munozes’s claim under the Pennsylvania
Deficiency Judgment Act is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.1 Initially, this Court
notes that although both the District Court and the parties assume that federal law of res
judicata applies, we must actually apply Pennsylvania state law of res judicata here.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
531 U.S. 497 (2001), this Court held that “[i]n a diversity action we apply the preclusion
rules of the forum state, unless they are incompatible with federal interests.” Houbigant,
Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 374 F.3d 192, 205 (3d Cir. 2004). See also Taylor v. Sturgell, 128
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The Munozes argue that the District Court erred when it granted summary
judgment to Sovereign on the res judicata issue because, under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
8103(e), any agreement to waive the protections of the statute is void, and therefore, even
though they did not object to the Consent order using the statute as their grounds, they
cannot now be deemed to have waived its protections. However, § 8103(e) speaks in
terms of an agreement to waive the provision, which is not applicable here, where there
was no waiver agreement.
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S.Ct. 2161, 2171 n.4 (2008) (“For judgments in diversity cases, federal law incorporates
the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which the rendering court sits.”) (citation
omitted); Semtek Intern., 531 U.S. at 508 (holding state claim preclusion law should
apply in a diversity case). As this is a diversity case, and Pennsylvania is the forum state,
Pennsylvania, not federal, preclusion law should apply.
“Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction will bar any future suit between the parties or their privies in
connection with the same cause of action.” Yamulla Trucking & Excavating Co., Inc. v.
Justofin, 771 A.2d 782, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). A consent decree is a final judgment
on the merits, unless there is an “express reservation of rights,” which is not present here.
Cf. United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 n.5 (3d Cir. 1984).
Pennsylvania law provides that, in order for the doctrine of res judicata to bar a
subsequent action, that action and the relevant prior action must share four conditions:
“(1) identity of the thing sued upon or for; (2) identity of the causes of action; (3) identity
of the persons or parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the
parties suing or being sued.” Unified Sportsmen of Pa. v. Pa. Game Comm’n (PGC), 950
A.2d 1120, 1128 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (citation omitted). We conclude that res
judicata bars the Munozes’s lawsuit for substantially the same reasons as set forth in the
District Court’s opinion.
Applying the requirements of Pennsylvania law, we believe that the “thing sued
upon” here is the same in the first action and in the second action -- the sale of the home.
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The requirement of the “identity of parties to the action” is also satisfied because
Sovereign was a creditor of the Munozes. See Am. Sur. Co. of New York v. Dickson, 28
A.2d 316, 334 (Pa. 1942) (“[T]he rule requiring [identity of parties] is subject to the
qualification that. . . those in privity with parties to the record, including attaching
creditors, are also bound.”) (citations omitted). In addition, the parties appear in their
same capacities. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36(2) (“A party appearing in
an action in one capacity. . . is not thereby bound or entitled to the benefits of the rules of
res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.”).
Finally, we find that there is sufficient identity in the cause of action to satisfy that
requirement for res judicata.2 “Generally, causes of action are identical when the subject
matter and ultimate issues are the same in both the old and new proceedings.” Unified
Sportsmen of Pa., 950 A.2d at 1128. See also Chada v. Chada, 756 A.2d 39, 43-44 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000) (“The essential inquiry is whether the ultimate and controlling issues
have been decided in a prior proceeding in which the present parties had an opportunity to
appear and assert their rights. When the cause of action in the first and second actions are
distinct, or, even though related, are not so closely related that matters essential to
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A claim can be barred by res judicata even if the party did not raise the claim in
the prior proceeding, so long as the claim should have been raised. Merkel v. W.C.A.B.
(Hofmann Indus.), 918 A.2d 190, 193 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007). See also Jost v.
Phoenixville Area School Dist., 547 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (“A judgment
is res judicata not only as to damages actually claimed but also as to those which could
have been sought.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the fact that the Munozes failed to
raise the Deficiency Judgment Act before the Bankruptcy Court is immaterial to our
analysis.
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recovery in the second action have been determined in the first action, the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply.”) (citations and emphasis omitted). Here, the subject matter -satisfying the deficiency judgment -- is the same in both this action and in the prior
action. In addition, the ultimate issue -- using the sale of the Moorestown property to
satisfy the deficiency -- is also the same. Cf. Weney v. W.C.A.B. (Mac Sprinkler Sys.,
Inc.), 960 A.2d 949, 955-56 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (finding that res judicata barred the
plaintiff’s claim, and that “the subject matter of both. . . proceedings was the nature and
extent of the injuries that [the plaintiff] suffered as a result of the. . . work incident, and
the ultimate issue in both proceedings was whether” the “nature and extent” of his injuries
were “accurately reflected” in a case where plaintiff knew of his neck pain at the time of
the first proceeding, and did not make a claim about it then, but then tried to raise his
neck injury as an issue in a second proceeding); Phila. Fraternal Order of Corr. Officers v.
Rendell, 701 A.2d 600, 607-08 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (finding that res judicata applied
when the parties and the underlying facts were the same and one party was merely trying
to replace a federal constitutional claim with a state one). Therefore, all of the
requirements for res judicata under Pennsylvania law have been satisfied.3
V.
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Sovereign.
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The Munozes’s derivative claims for breach of contract, conversion and fraud are
also precluded for the reasons set forth above.
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